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Introduction: Two Political Traditions:
The period from the demise of the Liberal Party in 1968, following the
introduction of the Prohibition of Political Interference Act, to the
1976 fioweto students revolt can be seen as an important transitional
period in South African politics that requires re-evalution by students
of contemporary history. These years mark in particular the eclipse of
a tradition of paternalistic welfare liberalism in South Africa
stretchinff back to the inter-war years and the foundation of the South
African Institute of Race Relations in 1929. At the same time they also
pinpoint the re-emergence of a tradition of democratic radicalism
anchored around the Freedom Charter after its initial suppression at
the time of the State of Emergency in 1960 and the banning of the
I'.A.C. and A.N.C.(l). These two traditions have often confused in the
minds of some analysts and a recent volume of essays has effectively
sought to claim most of the recent phase of liberalism in South Africa
in tornts of a programme of democratic participation, despite the
refusal of the Liberal party to take part in the organisation behind
t.lio freedom Charter in 1955 (2).
At points the two traditions interlocked in South African politics,
though v.hey also came on occasions into antagonism despite having a
common enemy in a segregationist white state. The two traditions in
some respects represented extensions into South Africa of European
political thought. The first strand derived broadly speaking from a
ninteenth century vision of a common culture anchored around hierarchy
and order: Disraeli's vision of one nation. The other strand derived
from a tradition of democratic struggle for citizenship rights which,
from the TRROs, fed into the nascent trade union movement and into the
democratic socialism of the Rritish Labour party. Significantly both
traditions sought access to political power at the centre and to
capture the: state from within. In the South African instance this would
tend bol.h to reject a programme of violent class or racial war or the
to outside intervention (3).
The progressive eclipse of the tradition of paternalistic welfare
liberalism was in part due to its failure to misread the central
trajectory of post 1948 politics in South Africa. As Legassick has
observed, the highpoi.nt of this strand of South African liberalism was
I.he Second World War when it appeared that the logic of
industrialisation was beginning to break through the barriers of racial
segregation. The resurgence of Afrikaner nationalism after 1948
appeared to many of these liberals to be an atavistic throwback to a
pre-imliistrial era governed by an anti capitalist racial ideology
derived Prom the frontier (4). The tradition continued to enjoy an
extended lease of life, due in part to the international reputation
enjoyed by the Institute, though it was still the case that it failed
to generate significant degrees of financial support from organised
business. By the 1960s the Institute's membership settled down at the
modest, figure of some 4088 members in 1961, while by 1973-4 it was
still only 4300.
The weakness of the mainstream conservative paternal, ists also derived
from a more basic structural weakness at the local level of South
African politics. In the English case liberalism had been able to
evolve out of an aristocratic Whig ideology in the nineteenth century
and widen its appeal in the twentieth by becoming effectively the.
Knglish ideology (5). Despite the tendency of many South African
liberals to look to the English model, a better parallel lay with
ninr-r.oenl.il century Germany where liberalism was based on a set of
in forma. 1 ties cultivated by local urban Honoratioren possessing a
KI'CII re pos i tion wi thi n thei r own provinc.i al soci eti es. These notables
|ir>wp(| unable to adapt to the demands of a rising social democracy
wlii I*; their political legitimacy became undermined by the
bureaucrat i sat ion of urban government. As a consequence the urban
liberals forfeited the claim to embrace both national and local issues
(fi). m I.he South African instance, various efforts were made at the
local levels by liberals and "friends of the natives", especially
through the missions, to take a lead in social and economic issues by
t.he inter-war years. In the Eastern Cape, James Henderson, the
Principal of I.ovedale, sought to mobilise concern on reclamation of the
reserves; while at Mariannbi 11. Bernard Huss sought to mobilise interest
by the state in African cooperative credit societies. Hut such efforts
were usually ad hoc ones and the individuals and groups involved failed
to achi eve the same status as 1ocal d i gnatori es as the Honorat i oren
(7).
The generally narrow political base of this conservative strand of
welfare liberalism meant that by the post 1945 period it became
i n.re.'is ingl y necessary to form an alliance with more radical political
groups. Those in control of the Institute hoped this could be effected
on an agenda over which they had control, for there was a legacy of
conflict with critics of the Institute's ostensibly apolitical position
such as The h'riends of Africa, organised by William and Margaret
Ballinger, in the 19!H)s (8). fiy the middle 1950s, however, the dominant
position of the conservative paternalists within the South African
I i beral estab!i shment began to come under i nereas i ng chal1enge w ith the
emergence of a more mass based Congress movement under Albert I.uthu.l i .
The formation of the Liberal, party after 1953 served in some respects
i.n divert, a fctention away from the work of more conservative 1 i beral
bodies like the Institute as the party performed the two-fold task of
attacking the policies of the apartheid state as well as the left-
leaning Congress of Democrats (C.O.D.). Cold war politics and anti
communism ensured that the mainstream liberals avoided close political
contact, with the Charterists in the 1950s. Political mobilisation
within the A.N.C. during the decade helped crystallise ideas of a
future multi-racial society that was envisaged as superseding the
existing apartheid regime. All this, though, was to be sharply
truncated by the I960 State of Emergency following Sharpeville and the
banning of the A.N.C. and P.A.C.
hi the early 1960s the Institute continued to reaffirm its "historical
and accustomed role, serving as a clearing house of ideas and a channel
of communication between groups" (9). The period, however, was notable
for the emergence of a more militant black radicalism in exile Congress
politics that sought a severing of the ties wit.h liberal and reformist
bodies. It was to be the intrusion of a new radicalism in the from of
Rlack Consciousness doctrines which was to renew the schism between the
conservat.ive paternalists and the radical democrats in the early 1970s.
The origins and development of these cleavages will thus form the
substance of this paper.
Liberals and the Institute of Race Relations:
The issue of the relationship of the conservative paternalists to
Charterist movements in exile did not immediately surface within
internal South African politics in the years after Sharpeville. The
disappearance of the Liberal Party in 196R however began a re-
ev;i I iiHt. ion hy a number of bodies within the South African liberal
esl'.uhl i shment of t.heir political role now that the party's buffering
function had been removed. Many activists in the Knglisn-speaking
churches us well as the South African Institute of Race Relations had
been able to take a somewhat detached position vis a vis the political
process RO long as the Liberal Party had been in existence. The Party's
conferences, newsletters as well as Contact had provided a focus for
political debate even though there appeared virtually no hope of ever
being able to win any form of electoral representation in the House of
Assembly. The party's very existence appeared to confirm the
continuation of a "liberal spirit" rooted in ideals of human rights and
parliamentary and democratic liberties that gave an added legitimacy to
the less overtly political forms of welfare work and empirical research
conducted by the Institute. Many of those involved in the Institute
were, furthermore, liberals with well established credentials. Leo
Marquard, a past president, confidently proclaimed in 1963 that the
Institute was "a liberal body" whose "only fear need be that it will
cease to be liberal" (10). Broadly speaking the Institute's 1954
statement of its overall goals Go Forward In Faith reflected the
thinking of a considerable section of post war South African liberals
in its emphasis upon economic growth eventually leading to some form of
"racial integration" into a common multi racial society (11).
Tho problem was, though, how were these ideas to be advanced on the
political plain and in some manner impressed onto mi apparently
intractable and impermeable body politic? Since the early 1950s many of
the Institute liberals had emphasised the need for a more indirect
strategy of trying to influence progressively minded sections of the
Dutch Reformed Churches and the younger Afrikaner intelligentsia (12).
Signs of nn early form of verligtheid in these quarters had been
apparent at the time of the debate in the DRCs on the Cottesloe
Consultation in 1960 and it was hoped that a more independent minded
group of dominees would emerge who would be less compliant to
government dictats (13). Similarly, Leo Marquard attended the annual
conference of SABRA in 1959 and reported the emergence of an
"independent body of thinking men" in its midst despite being sceptical
of its chances of freeing itself rom government, control (14).
This strategy of attempted toenadering with Afrikaner moderates did not
go without criticism. For some of the more radical clerics in the
Church of the Province such a Fabian effort at influencing government
policy was doomed to failure. Bishop Ambrose Reeves of Johannesburg,
for example, was strongly critical in 1958 of attempts by the Director
of the Institute of Race Relations, Quintin Whyte, to intervene in
church affairs and seek to promote a dialogue between the Dutch
Reformed Churches and the Church of the Province. Accusing Whyte of
acting as an "errand boy" for the D.R.C., Reeves pointed out that two
thirds of the members of the Church of the Province were black who
would exert a "strong reaction" to the Anglican communion meeting with
the D.R.C. leaders at an all-white conference (15).
In 1960, however, Reeves was deported from South Africa and the
Institute's assistant director Fred Van Wyk played an important role in
organising the Cottesloe Consultation from December 7 to 14th of the
same year between the South African member churches of the World
Council of Churches. The silencing of a number of critical activists in
the early J9fi0s provided the political space for the more conservative
reformists to maintain some degree of control over the direction of
political liberalism, one which was mainly conceived in terms of
seek ing l.o persuade the South African government to move towards a more
aocommadationist platform with regard to moderate black political
leadership* The Institute though still acted as an important platform
for traditional liberal criticisms of government apartheid policy. In
19H3 Judge 0.1). Schreiner, in the Institute's annual presidential
address, attacked the emphasis upon group as opposed to individual
rights in South African liberal thought and argued for an evolutionary
view of political change that would progressively widen the franchise
and lead to the growth of political parties that would not seek a power
base simply in ethnic ties (16).
Such sentiments however fell increasingly out of favour in the early
1960s as disillusion set in with progressive whig models of political
decolonisation. A number of figures in the Institute began to look
towards group-based political models in order to try and reform and
humanise government policy from within. Quint in Whyte, especially, was
concerned about the absence of any clear sense of direction among many
of the political liberals. He had replaced J.D. Rheinal.lt Jones as
Director of the Institute in 1946 and was strongly impressed by
American discussions of race relations that emphasised the pursuit of
an "educational" as opposed to a "moralistic" or "exhortatory" approach
in pursuit of "inter-racial justice" (17). By 1063 he began to doubt
the "strategy and maneuvring" of the Progressive Party which, he
thought, was in danger of reacting to government initiatives in an ad
hoc manner. It already seemed apparent that the South African economy
and polity was going to ride through the storm of international
criticism and it seemed essential to start thinking out a longer
strategy of accommodation with the Rantustan policy, "...why cry to
hli?li heaven that the plans of the Government in the Transkei are
eyewash", he privately noted, "and say that the Xhosa people are having
something imposed on them when the fact of the matter is that all the
vast, majority of the Xhosa people want independence" (18). Me suggested
in an Institute memorandum that liberals should seek to work within the
framework of the Homelands policy and put pressure on the government to
develop them further economically short of outright independence. Such
a strategy was, he felt, in accordance with R.F.A. Moernle's argument
in his 1939 Phelps Stokes lectures that total segregation was not
incompatible with the liberal spirit. The important point was to shift
away from being concerned simply with the means of government policy
towards the ends involved (19). At the end of 1963 Whyte also suggested
in a memorandum to Harry Oppenheimer of the Anglo American Corporation
that a high level international team be formed on the basis of funds
from the Ford Foundation to come and report on South African conditions
and make recommendations. It was important "to plan changes which will
take into consideration external opinion abnd internal realities" (20).
The suggestion does not appear to have met, at this stage, with much
enthusiasm, though the Ford Foundation eventually funded its own
investigation South Africa: Time Running Out in 1981 (21)
The attempt to engage international experts was in some respects a
reflection of the rather desperate mood that overtook a number of South
African liberals in the early 1960s as the government clamped down on
political activity and drove a number of activists either into exile or
silence (22). The effect of the government's intellectual terrorism
under its Minister of Justice John Vorster was the partial destruction
of the small cosmopolitan and politically radical intelligentsia that
had emerged since the late 1930s. This intelligentsia had been
committed to the application of rational analysis to historical and
political processes. Even those intellectuals on the radical left had
generally viewed the apartheid system as a mere historical anachronism
and atavistic throwback and there was a widely held view that
capitalist economic growth would in time assist in dissolving the
structures of racial segregation. By the middle 1960s, however, such
economi.st.ic optiraistism appeared to be increasingly chimerical. One
perceptive external observer, the South African liberal historian C.W.
de Kiewiet, wrote in the American journal Foreign Affairs in 1964 that
while liberal forces remained "the single most vital element of light
in darkness and hope in despair" there was nevertheless the problem
Unit "the cloud of resentment produced by South Africa's racial
policies hides the liberal elements in its murk. They feel abandoned,
and some have become bitter and angry" (23). Quintin Whyte in some
degree reflected this mood of growing isolation and, following a visit
to Britain and the United States in 1966, he became convinced that
South African liberals had to go it alone. "The foreign experts have
not been to South Africa and have no "feel" for anything", he wrote, "-
only a disembodied empathy with the oppressed. U.N. has had 18 years
scarification of South Africa result -Nil" (23).
It. was by no means clear to the Institute leadership in the middle to
In be 1960s where their overall political direction
was leading. An attempt was made to smear the Institute in 1965 by a
bogus organisation The League for Liberal Action which distributed a
pamphlet stating that the Institute was "assisting liberalism" in the
1). R. Church. Quintin Whyte was forced to deny that the Institute was
attempting to "sow the seeds of discord in the Afrikaans churches"
(24). Similarly the S.A.B.C. depicted the Institute in 1967 as standing
completely outside the mainstream dialogue in South African politics
and gloatingly concluded that "if the Institute wishes to take part in
it, and to make a meaningful contribution, then it will have to draw
nearer the main, though turbulent stream, of South African thought"
(25). By 1969, Whyte confessed to de Kiewiet that growing Afrikaner
political- self confidence and the apparently new agenda initiated
through Prime Minister John Vorster's "Outward Looking" policy
indicated that "liberals will have to re-think themselves in light of
all this and adopt new strategies to be directed towards the same
general ends. But don't ask me what these should be!" (26).
By the end of the 1960s, therefore, a political impasse had been
reached, especially as the demise of the Liberal Party enhanced the
general sense of political isolation in the Institute. This became
further evident as the Institute's position began to come under renewed
attack from more radical forces both within its own ranks as well as
externally from a militant younger generation of black and white
intellectuals.
Black Consciousness and the upsurge of democratic radicalism:
The loss of direction in the S.A.I.Ii.R. occurred at the same time as a
renewal of democratic radicalism in South African politics. There were
a number of sources of this including the upsurge of student radicalism
in Europe in the late 1960s which encouraged the spread of militant
ideas both in NUSAS as well as the black South African Students
Organisation (SASO) after its secession from NUSAS in 1969 (27). The
advance, too, of decolonisation in Africa during the 1960s and Fanonist
ideas of anti colonial struggle aided the spread of Black Consciousness
doctrines, while the spread of Black Power ideas from the United States
in the late 1960s encouraged a distrust of white liberals, who were
seen as a threat to independent black self assertion. These influences
fused with an indigenous Africanist tradition in black South African
politics stretching back to the Ethiopian church movements earlier in
the century and the Congress Youth League of the 1940s (28).
The spread of Black Consciousness had a strongly radicalising effect on
a number of white radicals who had become disaffected from the cautious
tine of the Institute in the course of the 1960s. In 1963 the Christian
Institute had been established under the directorship of Dr Beyers
Naude as part of a drive for ecumenism in South African churches
following the Cottesloe Statement of 1960. For the rest of the decade,
the general tone of the CI through its periodical Pro Veritate was a
Reformed theology derived from the struggle for a Confessional Church
in Nazi Germany. Thereafter, it came increasingly under the influence
of liberation theology and Black Power (29). Though it had only a small
membership of some 2000, the C.I. did seek to establish closer contacts
with African churches, especially those that were organised by the
Interdenominational African Ministers Association of Southern Africa
(I0AMASA). Grants of R1000 from the World Council of Churches and R2000
from the Bantu Welfare Trust (organised under the S.A.I.R.R.) provided
IDAMASA with a secretary and office assistant in 1964 and a number of
young black churchmen began to be sent to the Federal Theological
Seminary at Alice in the Eastern Cape on the basis of bursaries
provided by the Theological Education Fund in New York. (30).
IDAMASA approached the Christian Institute for assistance in
establishing ft theological school, theological correspondence courses
in African vernaculars as well as theological "refresher" courses. The
C.I. saw this as an opportunity for developing "Black initiated
agencies under Black leadership" (31), though in the case of Nyanga in
Cape Town in 1966 it was still the case that little had been done to
get white members to "come together" with the black membership (32).
The C.I. assisted in the establishment of a Council of African
Independent Churches (ATCA) which had a membership of 261 by March of
1969 as well as a theological, school at Alice and a Womens Association
of African Independent Churches. In addition Fred Van Wyk and Beyers
Bnuflfi acted as "advisers" to IDAMASA, though in January 1970 Van Wyk
left to take over the directorship of the S.A.I.R.R. from Quintin
Whyte. But the work with the independent churches was ultimately seen
as disappointing as inadequate funding prevented any substantial
organisation while the churches themselves were prone to fission,
especially after the establishment of a rival to IDAMASA in the form of
the Reformed Independent Churches Association (RICA) under a white
minister of the N.G. Kerk, Rev N.J, Van Loggenberg. Beyers Naude
encouraged AICA to become more independent financially as he tried to
steer the C.I. away from any involvement with AICA*s own internal
splits or "a false image of AICA being created through its close
association with the Christian Institute". No further financial
assistance was given after 1973 and the link with the independent
churches declined before the C.I.'s banning in 1977 (33).
The C.I. became more closely drawn to black student politics, firstly
through the University Christian Movement and then SASO after its
estabLishent in 1969. Black Consciousness
was seen as challenging some of the central tenets of traditional white
"welfare work" and by 1970 the C.I. leadership was "aware of the fact
that more and more Black students and intellectually awakened youth
will move into a position of Black power, rejecting all offers of
assistance on the part of Whites to aid them in their struggle towards
freedom" (34). Such considerations prompted a more general intellectual
effort to think through new modes of political, economic and social
change in South Africa and the degree to which there had emerged a
"serving middle class" among Africans such as teachers, nurses,
journalists, clergymen who could be the "pattern setters" for the rest
of black society (35). This led to the establishment conjointly with
the South African Council of Churches of the Study Project on
Christianity in Apartheid Society (SPRO-CAS) consisting of six study
commissions embracing 150 academics and researchers in the fields of
economics, education, law, the church, and the social and. political
sciences. The project was directed by a former officer of the Institute
of Race Relations in Natal, Peter Randall, who had become disillusioned
by the late 1900s in the SAIRR's general lack of political direction.
The South African Council of Churches had been especially prompted to
support the initiative following the 1970 Statement by the World
Council of Churches consultation on racism. For many in the SACC the
statement reflected the fact that the South African churches had
failed, in the words of one executive member Calvin Cook, to "convince
their brethren overseas of their bona fides, even where these may
exist" (36). For many liberals as well as radicals it became
increasingly apparent that a new course of action had to be thought
through.
In its initial phase the work of SPRO-CAS represented to some
conservative paternalists a useful location for testing the political
potential of group-based models of liberalism. South Africa's
"political ills", Quintin Wliyte wrote to Randall, were "largely due to
a completely false and outmoded idea of the nature of the nation or a
group in society and its function". It was necessary "somewhere to
argue the true nature of groups in society which are based on interests
commonly held between members" (37). Such an approach was impressed on
the work of the various commissions, especially on political change.To
radicals, on the other hand, the work of the SPRO-CAS commissions
appeared to confirm the degree to which Black Consciousness challenged
many of the basic presuppositions of mainstream liberalism in South
Africa. Even moderate black political leaders such as Gatsha Buthelezi
wrot« to Peter Randall to explain that:
Within the Church itself our people have had such a rebuff from the
majority of white Christians that the Church has not become the
effective instrument of change it could have been, had this been not
the case. If the Church gave more opportunities for Christians of
different racial groups to meet and if the Church became the forum for
dialogue then one could have hoped that there were great
possibilities. Bodies like the Institute of Race Relations and the
Christian Institute offer the opportunity, but most Non-Whites are sc
ared of making any use of these forums to meet and talk because of the
persecution this can lead to (38)
For many Black Consciousness activists this apparent failure of the
Churches to act as a forum for political dialogue was irrelevant. As
one SASO document reprinted as a SPRO-CAS background paper declared,
the whole notion of racial "integration" was pivoted around liberal
"arrogance" and a product of "conscious maneuvre" rather than the
"climate of the inner soul". "The myth of integration as propounded
under the banner of liberal ideology must be tracked and killed" it
continued, "because it makes people believe that something is being
done when in actual fact the artificially integrated circles are a
soporific on the blacks and provide a vague satisfaction for the
futility stricken whites" (39). The SPRO-CAS project thus quickly found
itself pivoted between rival liberal and radical political positions,
making the task of formulating a generally acceptable middle political
course a difficult one to achieve.
The work of SPRO-CAS One became, in the event, a highly academic one of
debating various models of political, economic and constitutional
change. Most of those'involved were white male academics, though this
was in part due to the reluctance of some long standing Liberal
activists like Alan Paton to become involved and the apparent inability
to find any significant black intellectual support for the project
(40). The work of the Political Commission was especially significant
for developing a debate on the political and ethical basis for a South
African liberalism. The Director of the Project, Peter Randall, became
considerably impressed by the work of the political scientist Andre Du
Toit at the University of Stellenbosch who stressed the need for a
group-based approached to liberal rights and duties. It appeared that a
"parting of the ways" was at hand between those whom Du Toit termed the
"doctrinaire liberals" and "those willing to look to new approaches and
alternatives" (41). Alan Paton, though, was careful to warn Randall
that", there could be no simple blueprint for a federal system in South
Africa that incorporated group identities, even if this might be
expected from the Project (42).
The Spro-Cas Political Commission contained the radical figure of Rick
Turner from the University of Natal, though a banning order in March
1973 prevented him from fully engaging in the latter stages of its
report South Africa's Political Alternatives. Turner's presence was
significant for helping to shift some of the initial discussions away
from the traditional liberal theme of how to change racial attitudes
towards a more sociologically penetrating debate on the nature of the
South African "plural society". Turner was generally perceived as a
radical political figure, who was concerned with formulating a notion
of "white consciousness" to meet the ideological challenge presented by
the emergence of Black Consciousness doctrine. He stressed, though,
that white liberals should not be perceived by radicals as a
significant political force capable of overthrowing apartheid and that
the term "white liberalism" as it had come to be emplyed by many BC
radicals was "uselessly broad". It was necessary to categorise whites
in ho groups of racists, liberals and radicals and these terms could
equally be applied in black politics as well. Once these shared
political perspectives were recognised, it should then be acknowledged
that the notion upheld by many BC advocates that only blacks could talk
to blacks was based upon an inadequate theory of communication. In
essence there were differences of degree rather than kind between
blacks and whites in South African and white radicals could, in
particular, still make a useful contribution to the overthrow of the
apartheid system (43).
Turner went on to develop this line of thinking in his work for the
SPRO-CAS Political Commission. In a draft section on economics he
stressed the importance of sociological models of pluralism derived
from the work of the anthropologist J.S. Furnivall in Indonesia. In the
original conception of pluralism the emphasis had been centred on the
role of economic forces and the market place in determining social
relationships. Turner sought to elaborate this on the basis of the
theoretical work of the former South African sociologist John Rex, who
luxl explained the economic base of the South African "plural society"
in terms of a neo-marxist model of colonial capitalism and the need for
a ready supply of labour. This reinforced the argument that "group
conflict" in South African society was underpinned by a conflict of
economic interest while the roots of racial prejudice lay in "the
objective relations of domination set up by the conquest and the
institutionalisation of conquest, and they are not likely to be
extirpated until this is pointed out, nor are they likely to stop
rerooting themselves while the system of economic inequality persists"
(44).
Turner's work for the Political Commission was significant for its
attempt to shift the focus away from the simple issue of trying to
redefine the liberal agenda in South Africa around group rather than
individual rights. The final report, he suggested in some notes, should
be concerned with the distribution of both political and economic power
and should contain an ideal model "in terms of which the situation
should be judged". Such a model should contain both ethical concepts as
well as the form of their expression, meaning the "common society
approach". The key to this notion was democratic control .over social
resources and whether it should be capitalist or socialist. It was at
l.his point that the Commission should be concerned with "the problem of
what to do about the situation", for it was possible analytically to
distinguish between change in the direction proposed by "voting
Christians" (ie whites) or changes by "non voters" developing the
power to force it (45).
Turner's adoption of a radical notion of pluralism inhibited any focus
on the state and its independent capacity to adapt to or resist change.
This has remained a lacuna in South African political debate until
quite recently (46). Nevertheless, his approach raised a number of
important structural problems which the Commission in the event sought
as far as possible to minimise, partly in the interests of seeking some
form of common consensus amongst its members. It became clear in the
course of 1972 that Turner's radical input added to an already
complicated situation in which there was a considerable divergence
between different parties to the Commission. On the one hand, there was
a classical or orthodox liberal position held by the veteran liberal
Edgar Brookes, who emphasised individual rights and considered the
emphasis upon group rights as a new form of adaptation to segregation
(which Brookes felt himself to have been guilty of in the 1920s before
a slow shift in the course of the 1930s to a more conventional liberal
position (47). On the other hand, Dennis Worrall represented a right
wing and neo corporatist emphasis upon groups (to a degree that was to
make him, for a period, a favoured figure in policy-making circles) and
who dissociated himself from the "common society" approach in favour of
"multi-nationalism" and some form of confederal political solution
(4ft). Given these divergences, Peter Randall tended to support Du
Toit's effort at a "middle course" that would emphasise both group and
10
individual rights. In the process, though, of preserving the "common
society" conception more radical notions of a structural shift in the
locus of economic power tended to get discarded.
South Africa's Political Alternatives did nevertheless show some signs
of Turner's influence, especially in its discussion of plural society
theory. The Report marked a significant break with the strand of post
war liberalism which had relied on economic growth as eventually
inducing political change. It recognised that in its existing condition
South Africa was a "divided plural society", though it contrasted this
with the ideal of an American style "open pluralistic society": the
question it then posed was how far was a transition from the first to
the second possible. Turner's emphasis upon the structural
underpinnings behind the cleavages in the plural society model and the
demand for labour was downplayed in favour of a more authentically
] Lberal discussion on the "complex interplay" of the processes of
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 integration" and "acculturation" (49). Black Consciousness was viewed
as possibly presenting a "countervailing separatism" to that of the
"imposed separatism" of government policy (50), leading to a discussion
on the possibilities of what Hoernle had termed a "true separation" in
contrast to the existing segregation that favoured white supremacy
(51).
The Commission Report rested on traditional liberal concepts of the
rule of law, personal freedom and civil liberties and equality of
opportunity as opposed to equality of wealth. It expressed severe
reservations on the applicability of a Westminster-style system of
parliamentary government in South African conditions. The Christian
concepts of "love and brotherhood" could not, like the negative claims
of frofdom and equality, be translated so easily into political
arrangements and the Report sought to avoid any wide-ranging Utopian
social values in its ideals for a future South African society. It was
far more concerned with developing a feasible model of a devolution of
political power away from that of the administrative echelons of the
central state in order to facilitate access by the unenfranchised
majority to political power. Such an incremental approach led to a two
stage model of consociational bargaining between groups leading to the
eventual attainment of an open pluralistic society on lines similar to
a western political system (51). Short of advocating violent or
revolutionary change, the Commission Report was presented as one
possible way out of the political impasse that liberals found
themselves in by the early 1970s, drawing upon rational models of
bargaining from the social sciences. To some critics there still
appeared to be an element of Utopian idealism involved in the Report.
The Artfus, for example, viewed it as "yet another manifesto of radical,
redemptive politics; yet another all-including socio-political system -
a political idealism within which a new Spouth Africa would arise
purged from its inhumanities" (52). In Progressive Party circles,
however, the Report began to lead to some rethinking. As Colin Eglin
admitted to Quintin Whyte, the Party's policy of a federal solution for
South Africa had led it to "play down the fact that it is committed to
the redrawing of the Constitution and has ignored almost entirely any
steps in transition from the present situation to the one it sets as
its goal" (53). To this extent, the Report could be seen as
contributing to a reassessment of pragmatic political action rather
than a naive political idealism
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For radicals, however, the very top-down nature of the Report's
consociationalism divested it of any major significance for long-run
political and economic change. Rick Turner had been critical of it in
its draft stage, arguing that its employment of a consociational
democracy approach appeared to ignore the problems of economic conflict
almost entirely (54). Turner refused to identify himself with the
Report in its final form and proceeded to publish through SPRO-CAS a
strikingly alternative Utopian political vision for a future South
Africa in the form of the essay The Eye of the Needle in 1973. The book
managed l.o have a fairly powerful impact on political debate, selling
2000 copies before being banned by the government. It emerged at a time
when the ideals of the Freedom Charter had faded to a rather distant
memory and there seemed to be few clear conceptions of what kind of
society a post apartheid South Africa would be. Turner's essay
reflected an ethical socialism in a tradition that stretched back to
such Victorian figures as John Ruskin and William Morris. Its concern,
too, for shifting power away from the central state to local bodies was
in keeping with the student radicalism of the late 1960s in Europe as
well as a longer tradition that in Britain went back to the guild
socialist movement during and after the First World War.
Turner urged a return to Utopian thinking as necessary in order to
develop a more theoretical attitude in South African politics, though
at least one critic, W.A. de Klerk, argued that this had been precisely
the problem with apartheid which had itself been based on Utopian
political thought (55). Utopianism for Turner was part of a wider
project, to engage more directly with the present as history, which
could no longer be seen as something abstracted from contemporary
processes. To this extent, his thinking was on similar lines to that of
some other radical figures at this time in South Africa such as Nadine
Gordimer who, in her novels The Late Bourgeois World (1966) and A Guest
of Honour (1971) was also concerned with moving kn>m what Clingman
has termed the "liberal humanist" framework of earlier work towards
situating her characters within a more immediate historical process
that could look beyond the paramaters of white rule (56). Turner looked
towards a "participatory democracy" emerging in a future socialist
South Africa, partly modelled on experiments such as Ujamaa villages in
Tanzania as well as workers cooperatives in Jugoslavia. There was no
recognition of the possibilities of an intricate neo colonial society
emerging on lines broadly similar to Gordimer's mythical African state
in A Guest of Honour* Even the remnants of the "communal and person-
orientated" values of tribal society were seen as a possible
"counterculture" to the effects of conservative socialisation, though
Turner was careful to point out the flaws in current concepts of
African socialism which relied on a mythical view of the African past
as essentially classless (57). The importance of Black Consciousness
was recognised, though Turner stressed its essentially middle class
quality. Being black was not really a political programme and the Black
Consciousness advocates had not as yet spelt out what new values were
entailed by the doctrine (58). Despite its strongly socialist tone, the
book was not hostile to the work of white liberals, whom Turner saw as
important for possibly being able to steer the society away from a
"final bloody showdown" whilst at the same time helping to "inject a
greater element of rationality into white thinking" (59): such an
assessment was doubtless one of the reasons why the book in its
American edition earned warm praise from Alan Paton who considered it
as an essay on the South African condition "as searching as any that
lias ever been written" (60). The essay can also be seen as marking the
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tail end of a tradition of romantic radical idealisation of African
soc i ety counterposed to western capitalism and ushering in a more hard
headed reassessment of African post colonial politics in the course of
the late 1970s and 1980s.
The Rv& of the Needle's utopianism nevertheless led it to a commitment
to what Turner termed a "transcendent morality" concerned with the
ultimate purposes of human life as opposed to the more immediate
"internal morality" of paying debts and not cheating or stealing. It
saw capitalism as essentially an alienating and un-Christian form of
social system and looked to a society that treated people not as means
but as ends in themselves. This certainly put it at odds with the main
thrust of South Africa's Political Alternatives and a number of the
liberals involved in that project received the work somewhat coolly,
though Peter Randall defended its utopianism on the grounds that it was
essential to have an ideal yardstick by which to formulate "conscious
goals for the improvment of our society". The work was, he claimed, "a
serious attempt to relate the values of Christianity to the structures
of our society" (61). At a seminar in Stellenbosch from 29 September
to 1 October 1973 on strategies for political change Frederifc Van Zyl
Slabbert argued that the book's utopianism led it away from the path of
feasible political action. Politics was "not the abstract universal
search for a common good", lie declared for it was the "process of
synthesizing a variety of interests within a common policy, and only
those interests which appear in the political process get included in
the final policy" (62). It was not clear either where the increased
awareness for the kind of society that Turner envisaged was going to
come from, though other participants such as Geoff Budlender suggested
that radical whites could accept the basic tenets of the Black
Consciousness model and play an essentially supplementary role in
he.lp.ing black solidarity on the one hand and fragmenting the white
power bloc on the other (63).
For Andre Du Toit, on the other hand, The Eye of the Needle's macro-
political approach to change needed to be contrasted with the more
micro-political approach of the SPRO-CAS Political Commission which was
aiming less at "participatory democracy" than "effective participation
in government". It was important not to resort to a "moral emigration"
away from current social and political problems but to resort to
political action to try and remedy them, action that should also be
governed as far as possible by criteria of political effectiveness. For
students to seek involvment on these lines the chief aim should be
exemplary action, whose value could be quite high (64).
The broad thrust of the discussion indicated that there was some basis
for organised action by white radicals extending beyond merely symbolic
politics of the kind that had often been associated with student
radicalism in Western Europe in the late 1960s. Pressure for such
action made itself especially felt in the discussions on the SPRO-CAS
Two Programme in early 1972 where there was strong pressure for staff-
initated projects that were not centrally controlled by the executive.
Neville Curtis and Rick Turner urged a Youth Programme that would be
directed at high school and university students, "young workers" and
"opt outs". In addition, a Black Community Programme got off the ground
after 1971 involving a survey of black organisations and a programme of
consultation focussing on training in administration, committee
operation and secretarial skills. The BCP was under the direction of a
former worker in the YMCA, Bennie Khoapa, who helped gather together a
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group of Black Consciousness radicals around the Programme, including
Steve Biko and the trade unionist and journalist Bokwe James Mafuna
(65).
The academically-inclined work of the Study Commissions since 1969 now
started to lead to pressure for more coordinated action that would
involve both the Christian Institute as well as possibly the SAIRR in a
broadly based programme of radical change. SPRO-CAS staff met Fred Van
Wyk, Clive Nettleton and Dudley Horner of the SAIRR to discuss co-
ordination of their work (66). There was also strong pressure from
within the BCP for autonomous control over its functioning. Khoapa made
it clear to Peter Randall that the black staff on the project would
find unacceptable any proposal for a joint steering committee to
nversee the work of both the black and white-led programmes. For Khoapa
and the BCP staff the only real obligation was one of communication to
the sponsors of the projects in order for as full a degree of autonomy
as possible (67). This position really emerged as a pragmatic response
to a much harder stand made by some of the radicals within the BCP.
There were growing black suspicions over the nature and direction of
the SPRO-CAS project and one activist, Rev Clive MacBride, accused both
SPRO-CAS and the SAIRR of being "liberal organisations" that "get money
on our ticket (blacks) and very little of the money really filters
through to the grass roots". For others such as Steve Biko the issue
raised broader questions over the relationship of whites and blacks in
the SPRO-CAS programme and on the sources of the money that were
financing it. Khoapa urged an acceptance of the fact that the programme
as such had been sponsored and to work from that starting point. In the
event, some broad agreement was secured around the idea that the BCP
would create as few "structures" as possible and that the Programme
would act as the "midwife" to "real community organisations which may
or may not be created by the people themselves when the programme draws
to a close". It was hoped that the black panels would be able to
develop their own national panel which could act as a "guiding body in
terms of broad policy principles and other recommendations that it
deems fit" (68).
By the end of 1972 the emergence of Black Consciousness ideology was
beginning to exert a major impact on the work of white-run liberal
organisations in South Africa. The SPRO-CAS Programme had led to strong
demands by its black members for their own autonmous area of political
space for the formulation of specifically black political demands. This
was significantly occurring at a time when there was a major political
vuciimn in black politics, though one that Gathsha Buthelezi in Kwazulu
was hoping to try and fill at a time when his strategy of seeking to
use apartheid platforms against government policy won considerable
respect in liberal quarters. For a number of the more conservative
figures in the Institute of Race Relations the challenge by both the
white radicals and Black Consciousness activists was one that should as
far as possible be resisted. The Black Consciousness radicals
consciously adopted a policy of refusing to debate with whites the
"pros and cons" of the doctrine and this in a sense reinforced the
hand of the conservative critics who argued against a strategy of major
concessions (69). Furthermore, the Institute's "old guard" clearly felt
much was at stake in keeping open what thin lines of communication they
already had with the government in Pretoria. Over the following year a
strong line of resistance ensued which nullified the hopes of any form
of political unity in the liberal camp. Such internal feuding,
paradoxically, aided the growth of Black Consciousness thinking. This
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ended up shattering any hopes at this stage of an alliance of white
and black radicals operating outside the parameters of mainstream
white-run liberalism in South African politics.
The Response from the Institute of Race Relations:
The conservative paternalists indeed proved quite adept at organising
an effective resistance within the South African Institute of Race
Relations against proposals for closer links with SPRO-CAS and the C.I.
In the wake of the demise of the Liberal Party, the SAIRR was feeling
itself in quite an exposed position, though it was considered by one
observer, Heribert Adam, in the early 1970s to have emerged as "the
most significant and almost sole representative of traditional
liberalism in South Africa" (70). Its reponse to the new pace of
political events in the early 1970s was somewhat protracted and still
shaped by the general view of apartheid as an historical anachronism
that had governed its thinking since the late 1940s (71). There was
considerable opposition to allowing the younger Institute members
forging links with radical organisations, a proposal which Leo Marquard
likened to a form of "moral blackmail" on the older members, "The
Institute might be compared to a good cart horse", he wrote to Fred Van
Wyk, "bred for that purpose and doing a good job. The young people want
it to be a race horse. If it tries to be one it will lose its character
and will end by being neither a good carthorse nor a racehorse". He
strongly urged the maintenance of a fairly hierarchical organisation in
which no staff members should attend meetings of the executive as of
right and "should not take part in debate unless asked for an opinion,
and should certainly not have a vote" (72).
Nevert.liR.less some of the Institute's leadership recognised that the
traditional strategy of trying to act as a bridge of communication
between different racial "groups" was no longer working and that some
reforms were necessary. Quintin Whyte urged shortly before his
retirement in 1969 a "shaking up" of the Institute for "the
effectiveness of liberalism, as it were, has declined here as in
America. We are entering a new period when old ideas on all sides will
have to be shaken up" (73).
The Institute's new Director Fred Van Wyk was sympathetic to such
arguments, though he continued to emphasise the traditional white
liberal areas of support such as voters for the Progressive Party. It
was important, he maintained, for the Institute to continue seeking an
"informed public", while at the same time maintaining a degree of
"caution and care" in persuading the "older generation" in the
Institute of the views of a younger generation that was emerging within
it (74). Over t.he following three years, this cautious strategy
continued to dictate Institute policy, which was confirmed in 1972 as
being committed to a peaceful and non cataclysmic mode of political
change (75). For the most part, the Institute's leadership was
reluctant to be seen to bend before the challenge of Black
Consciousness which Van Wyk saw as containing in many respects the same
sort of racial separationism which the Institute had been fighting in
the form of apartheid (76). This view was reinforced by the appointment
in 1972 of Duchesne Grice to succeed William Nkomo as President of the
SAIRR. Grice was a Durban lawyer with connections with commerce and
industry and was widely viewed as a "middle of the road" figure who was
anxious not to chart any new course or the Institute in the 1970s (77).
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Ideological support for Van Wyk's position also came from Ellen
Hellman, who had developed a strong influence on Institute policy
making since the early 1960s and was notable for standing on a number
of the Institute's committees including the one concerned with
research. As an anthropologist trained in the "culture contact" school
of Malinowski, Ellen Hellman had been concerned with emphasising since
at .least, the late 1930s the power of acculturation in South African
society. "All evidence11, she had written in 1948 "points to the
willingness of the Bantu to accept the admittedly superior western
culture" (78). Throughout the 1950s she had fought for the idea of a
"shared society" and common citizenship which she counter-posed to the
government's conception of "total territorial separation". She had,
though, steered clear of the Congress of the People and the Freedom
Charter (79).
The Institute's leadership decided on a firm line in opposition to its
radical critics when the issue emerged early in 1973 of whether or not
to give evidence to the government's Schlebusch (later Le Grange)
Commission of enquiry into universities, NUSAS and other liberal
organisations. To Grice it seemed necessary to appear before the
Commission since to do otherwise could be used as an excuse for
government attacks on the body (80). Ellen Hellman also considered that
recognition of the Commission was necessary and viewed the announcement
by the Christian Institute of support for staff in SPRO-CAS who would
refuse to appear before the Commission as mere "fun and games". "As far
as the IRR is concerned" she wrote to Qiiintin Whyte, "I believe that
the loss of 'activist' or radical young people and the disaffiliation
of NUSAS as well is pretty well inevitable and not a tragedy at all"
(fli).
The Institute's decision nevertheless caused an embarrassing split
within thp white liberal establishment at a time when it could ill
afford to be seen to be divided. Though some English language
newspapers like The Star supported the decision, to a number of
observers it appeared an indefensible cringing to government authority.
Helen Suzman fell out with Ellen Hellman's stand on the issue after
initially assuming that the Institute would side with the C.I.(82).
Some of the Institute's younger members such as Michael Savage, Horst
Kleinschmidt and Jonathan Paton announced that they would not give
evidence to the Commission and the Reverend Clive McBride called for
mass resignations from the Institute (83). Jonathan Paton called for a
new body to replace the Institute and Peter Randall bitterly attacked
it for being after 40 years a "white-led, white dominated, bourgeois
organisation. It stifles black initiative. It is an obstacle to change
and a hindrance to progress" (84). Patrick Lawrence in The Star
detected a general attack from "radical liberals" on the Institute's
standpoint (85).
Within the Institute, an effort was made by the group of younger
radicals to give their criticisms of the leadership some focus. Clive
Nebtleton, the organiser since 1970 of the Youth Programme and a former
NUSAS activist, urged a number of changes in Institute policy in a
memorandum in May 1973. It was essential, he argued, to get away from
"white, middle class academic values" and to develop publications with
a wider audience appeal. The Institute still operated on a moral and
humanistic level and failed to challenge the basic structures of South
African society. "The question is important", he wrote, "because the
lesson of Germany is that if one waits for the dramatic, gas chamber
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type legislation the possibility of stopping the rot is too far gone by
the time the need for active resistance becomes unmistakeable". It was
especially necessary, he continued, to recruit more black staff and
move away from the negative image which most blacks had of the
Institute (86).
The radical whites, though, had a generally shaky political base to
mount an attack on the Institute conservatives. The issue in some ways
recalled the previously unsuccessful effort to goad the Institute
leadership into a more political standpoint by Douglas Buchanan and
Alfred Xiima in 1942-3 (87). Outside the Institute the work of SPRO-CAS
One was already complete while the community-based work of SPRO-CAS Two
had forged an uneasy alliance with the black radicals led by Biko and
Khonpa. Some of the most committed of the radicals such as Horst
Kleinschmidt had already resigned while it became clear towards the end
of the year that the Institute conservatives led by Ellen He11man were
determined to resist the demands for major change.
To Ellen Hellman the white radicals were only interpreting what they
thought were "Black Power demands or stances", while the Institute
itself had receieved no direct calls from blacks with the exception of
Clive MacRride. She disputed Clive Nettleton's urging of a more
populist: publications policy, pointing out that previous efforts in
this direction had been unsuccessful and the material pulped (88).
Further backing for this view came from Professor Hendrik Van der Merwe
of the Centre for Inter-Group Studies at the University of Cape Town,
Professor Lawrence Schlemmer of the Institute For Social Research at
the University of Natal and Professor A.S. Mathews of the University of
Nntal (89). A very strong series of institutional supports thus began
to come into play behind the position of the conservatives and the
radicals found themselves increasingly isolated. Even cautiously
sympathetic activists at the local level, such as F.O. Joseph, the
Regional Secretary in the Cape, felt impelled to point out that "a
factor that always has to be borne in mind is that the existence of the
Institute, as it is presently organised, depends on the goodwill and
generosity of benefactors - mainly large industrial and business
enterprises and mining houses. We must, unfortunately perhaps, take
this into consideration in contemplating any change" (90). Clive
Nettleton, too, found himself further isolated after a security police
raid on the Institute's headquarters at Auden House in Johannesburg on
November 15 1973 led to an accusing finger being pointed at him for
informing the press, who arrived within twenty minutes of the event
(91).
By the time of the Institute's Council meeting in January 1974 the
radicals had been effectively marginalised. A programme of cautious
reform was agreed to involving attempts to increase hoth Afrikaner and
black membership, though it was accepted that there should be "no need
for any drastic changes in the Institute's approach and work" (92). The
Institute's Youth Programme continued for another year under the
control of Clive Nettleton, but in a reduced form and at the of 1975
Nettleton left the Institute. Links with business, especially the
mining industry, tended to become closer, especially after June 1974
when Alex Boraine, a labour practices consultant for Anglo American and
a member of the Institute's executive, was elected as a Progressive
Party M.P. for Pinelands in the Cape. The 1975-79 Fund raising Campaign
got off to a good start in its endeavour to raise Rl million by gaining
the sponsorship of Harry Oppenheimer. This ensured an income of
17
R150,0n0 a. year and helped to make up some of the gap in income as the
aid from the Ford Foundation fell from some R750O0 in 1974 to R260O0
(93).
The increased influence of Anglo-American in the Institute's funding
was a probable factor in the growing interest by the Institute's
leadership in consociational methods of political reform. The period of
1974 — 7f> was one of growing talk of "detente" in the wake of the April
1974 coup in Lisbon. The Prime Minister, John Vorster, told the Senate
in October that the country was "at a crossroads" and the cost of
confrontation would be "too high for southern Africa to pay" (94). The
Institute's Council discussed in early 1975 a number of papers
outlining models of political, change. In particular Andre Du Toit
introduced some of the basic ideas behind the SPRO-CAS Report South
Africa's Political Alternatives in a paper outlining the idea of a
"common area" in South Africa. This gave political substance to the
long-held Institute ideal of a "common society" except that Du Toit now
held it up as the terminus ad quern of a strategy of "pluralistic
devolution" of powers away from the centre towards bodies like the
Coloured Persons Representative Council and the Urban Bantu Councils
{9fi). The paper was an important indicator of the manner in wh i ch ideas
discussed originally on the peripheries of white politics in the early
1070s started to be moved quite rapidly towards becoming taken up in
mainstream political discourse.
The Institute of Race Relations in effect had begun to adopt a policy
of seeking to influence the direction of policy in Pretoria rather than
seeking to meet the challenge of Black Consciousness head on. Its
continued search, however, for some form of "dialogue" with the white
state, which had kept its hopes alive even in the bleakest years of the
1960s, further underlined the isolation of the black radicals in SASO
and the BPO, Such a separation from the ideological influences of white
liberalism created a vital political space which, as Sam Nolutshungu
has pointed out, "made it easier for Blacks to submit their sense of
their powerlesssness to the force of their hope, the belief in their
own ultimate victory" (96). The unleashing of such forces was to prove
critical for the course of South African politics in the years ahead.
Black Consciousness and the 1976 Soweto Revolt:
The development of Black Consciousness doctrines occurred at an uneven
rate in the early 1970s. The appeals of being Black, acting Black and
thinking Black gained most support amongst the growing secondary school
and university intelligentsia, though an effort was made at a more
nation-wide process of political conscientisation after the
establishment of the Black Peoples Convention (BPC) in 1972 (97). For
many of the BC radicals such as Steve Biko the appeal of the doctrine
lay in its challenge to "common society liberalism" and its
reinforcement of the notion of black self reliance without the
intervention of paternalistic white do-gooders. The period was one of
relative fluidity in political discussion as a new political generation
sought to cut for itself its own distinct path. "We blacks must sit
down to examine the various power groups in our midst", declared
Njabulo Ndr-bele in 1972 at a SASO symposium, "with a view to finding
out which of these groups can be most effective and relevant towards
our necessary, and hence natural, struggle for a meaningful
participation in the shaping of our country's destiny" (98). Unlike
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many RC rhetoricians, Ndebele stressed the political potential of the
peasantry in addition to black urban workers, whilst also pointing out
the economic base to apartheid. "Apartheid is no longer a pseudo
ideology", he argued, "it has become an economic principle. This is an
important development for the black person. It means that the black man
must be careful of concentrating on the racial struggle, to the
detriment of the economic struggle, because the latter may have become
morn important than the former" (99).
Nevertheless, the thinking behind Black Consciousness at this time
was rather ragged, though for one American analyst, Nigel Gibson, this
was a period of intellectual creativity compared with the aridities of
"scientific socialism" that later overtook the doctrine when it was
appropriated by AZAPO and the National Forum in the early 1980s (100).
There was no clear political programme before the upsurge of protest in
the schools in 1976 and in a number of ways the black intelligentsia
who had started off by disseminating the BC doctrine allowed it to run
out of control. In part this can be ascribed to the continuing
difficulties of political organisation in the early 1970s, with
continued bannings and a massive diversion of energy into the trial of
BC activists tried under the Terrorism Act in 1976 (1.01).
There was also, though, a somewhat naive faith in variouss forms of
economic black self reliance, whether in the from of cooperatives,
shops, farms or factories or simple "buy black" campaigns. In a curious
sense, many of the ideals inculcated by a number of pre-war white and
black missionaries and "friends of the native" of maintaining black
economic subsistence in the reserves linked to cooperative enterprises
iu the towns began to resurface in a somewhat different guise (102).
This suggests an important set of links between a mission-influenced
black folk memory at the local level in both the townships and the
reserves and ideas that began to be crystallised by the BC
intellectuals. Marxism and methods of class analysis had been
effectively peripheralised in the course of state repression in the
1960s and would only start to make a renewed impact in the late 1970s
in the course of the development of the black trade union movement and
more militant methods of struggle in both the factories and the
townships. The BC intellectuals • he "tied. - to turn inwards towards
more romantic concepts of anti-capitalism, though this did not mean a
simple regurgitation of the nationalism of Anton Lembede and the
Congress Youth League of the middle 1940s based upon agrarian self
reliance as Gail Gerhart has suggested (103). In essence, the BC
intellectuals sought a strategy of racial reassertion in an era when
Pan Africanism had declined in its political appeal. They did not seek
an heroic golden age, but simply the ideal of black national unity
which C.M.C. Ndamse called "the new day". Even here, though, the older
liberal notion of racial "integration" may be said to have survived,
albeit in a different sort of political language. "No member of the
white community in any part of South Africa", Ndamse continued, "can
harm the weakest or meanest member of the black race without the
proudest and the bluest blood of the nation being degraded" (104).
Whites were inextricably part of the common national society, though
one no longer governed by notions of "western civilisation" and
colonial trusteeship as the older liberal doctrine had presumed. The
language of racial biology, though, was also being resurrected at
precisely the time when it was beginning to be discarded by a more
cosmopolitan Afrikaner intelligentsia.
19
These idiosyncrasies would doubtless have been progressively ironed
out by the DC intellectuals if time had been added to the political
space which they found so essential for independent thought. The impact
of black theology, especially from the writings of James Cone in the
United States, was important at this time for stressing the need for
black collective pride in liberation and in the notion of a black
Christ. This also led to a rejection of the idea that blacks could only
be liberated when whites came to "love" them. However, it was still
difficult to break completely from the mainstream Christian message of
loving one's enemy as well as oneself and Cone admitted too that "the
presence of Black people in America...is the symbolic presence of God
and his righteousness for all the oppressed of the land" (105). At the
Rlack Renaissance Convention in December 1974, many of the tensions
between different factions of BC radicals began to surface as there
were worries that the doctrine could end up being treated either as an
intellectual curiosity or as the basis for a cultural rather than
political revival (106).
By this stage a pattern of organisation had already been established at
the school level through the South African Students Movement, which had
had its first general congress at Roodepoort in March 1972. In contrast
to the rather rambling pattern of organisation through the Black
Community Programmes or the Black Peoples Convention a network of
school branches was linked to regional executives, aided in 1976 by a
R4000 overseas grant for a full time organiser (107), SASM was by no
means the simple creation of SASO despite the importance of BC ideas in
galvanising it into political action. It was the SASM Action Committee,
elected on 13 June 1976, which formed the basis for the Soweto Students
Representative Council. The movement within the schools thus ran
considerably ahead of the BC intellectuals in SASO and the BPC, which
were only banned a full year after the June 16 revolt in Soweto, The
first phase of BC radicalism had by then come to an end, as the moral
and intellectual impact of BC thinking had been demonstrated,
especially in breaking former links with white liberals. It was clear,
though, that in many ways BC thinking had inherited many assumptions of
liberalism and these would feed into a new debate that would begin to
emerge in the late 1970s amd early 1980s surrounding the upsurge of
unrest among black labour and the emergence of new political
organisations such as the U.D.F. and N.F. in 1983. By this time, some
of the ideas for top-down consociational political reform held by a
number of white liberals in the early 1970s had begun to permeate the
thinking of the state itself leading to plans for a new constitution
based on a tricameral parliament, To this extent, the ideological
debates of the early 1970s were an important phase in the emergence of
more mass-based political struggles in the following decade as well as
a catalyst for an effort at rethinking and remoralising liberal ideas
in South African politics.
University of Bristol, May-June 1989.
References.
1.Raymond Suttner, The Freedom Charter - The People's, Charter in the
Ni neteen Eighties. Cape Town, University of Cape Town, 1984.
2.Jeffrey Butler, Richard Elphick and David Welsh (eds).Democratic
Liberalism in South Africa, Middletown (Conn), Wesleyan University
Press and Cape Town and Johannesburg, David Philip, 1987.
3.The membership of the A.N.C.'s Umkhonto We Sizwe at the Rivonia
Trial in 1963 also denied any charges of seeking any external
military intervention in South African political affairs, Hilda
Bernstein, The World That Was Ours, London, SAWriters, 1989, pp.
142-3.
4.Martin Legassick, "The Rise of Modern South African Liberalism:
Its Assumptions and Social Base", London, I.C.S. (mimeo), 1972,
p. 30; "Legislation, Ideology and Economy in Post 1948 South
Africa", JSAS, 1, (1974), pp. 5-35.
5.Robert Ecoleshall, "The Identity of English Liberalism", Politics
ty-» 9. 1 (1979), pp. 1-32. See also Michael Bentley, The
Climax of Liberal Politics, London, E. Arnold, 1987,
6.James J. Sheehan, "Liberalism and the City in Nineteenth Century
Germany", Past and Present, 51, (May 1971), pp. 116-38.
7.Paul B. Rich, "The Appeals of Tuskegee: James Henderson, Lovedale
and the Fortunes of South African Liberalism, 1906-1930", TJAHS.
20. 2 (1987), pp. 271-92; "Bernard Muss, Mariannhill and African
Cooperatives in South Africa, 1924-48", unpublished paper,
University of Bristol.
8.Paul B. Rich, White Power and the Liberal Conscience: Racial
Segregation and South African Liberalism I960. Manchester,
Manchester University Press and Joliannesburg, Ravan Press, 1986,
esp. pp. 77-97.
9.South African Institute of Race Relations. 34th Annual Report.
19Mdl> Johannesburg, S.A.I.R.R., 19R3, p. 1.
10. Leo Marquard. "Liberalism and the Institute", Johannesburg,
S.A.I.R.R., unpub. memo RR 1/1963, p. 3.
11.South African Institute of Race Relations, Go Forward In Faith:
The Logic of Economic Integration.Johannesburg, S.A.I.R.K., 1954.
l2.Quintin Whyte, Behind The Racial Tensions in South Africa.
Johannesburg, S.A.I.R.R., 1953. p. 14.
2/
131n 1957 Quintin Wbyte began discussions with Professor L.J, Du
Plessis and some other Afrikaner figures who were critical of some
aspects of Government policy, especially on the reserves. Leo
Maronarri Papers, Jagger Library, University of Cape Town, BC587
F.I. 1.13 Q. Whyte to L. Marquard 25 April 1957; Fred Van Wyk
Papers, Church of the Province Archives, University of the
Witwatersrand, AD1752/33BO42 Lex Van Wyk to F. Van Wyk 25 May 1960
encl. "Notes on thinking about race problems in the NedGeref
Kerk"; Ben Marais to F. Van Wyk 31 October 1960 encl."Further
Notes by Ben Marais"; Paul B. Rich, "Doctrines of'Change1 in
South Africa" in John D. Brewer (ed), Can SouthAfrica Survive.
London and Basingstoke, The Macmillan Press, 1989, pp. 281-311.
14. Leo Marquard Papers. Jagger Library, University of Cape Town,
RO5R7 El.145 "Report of Sabra Conference, Durban 31 March-3 April
(marked "confidential"), 13 April 1959.
15. Quintin Whyte Papers. Church of the Province Archives, University
of the Witwatersrand, AD1502 Ba 4, "Notes On Interview With Bishop
Reeves", 27 October 1958.
160.D. Schreiner, Political Power in South Africa. Johannesburg,
S.A.I.R.R., 1964.
17.Quintin Whyte, "Techniques in Race Relations", unpnb. memo RR
96/52, Johannesburg, S.A.I.R.R., 1952; "Human Relations in the
United States", Race Relations Journal. LX111 (1951), pp. 16-26.
Whyte at this time viewed the role of liberals as pivotal in
African politics for it was "certain that for many years tocome
the advance of the Non European peoples will depend to a great
extent upon the active collaboration and help which they will
receive, not only from a European-dominated government but also
from a sympathetic and liberal-minded European public on whose
shoulders has so far lain the responsibility for the initiation of
inter-racial cooperation", Quintin Whyte, "Inter-Racial
Cooperation" in Ellen Hellman (ed), Handbook on Race Relations in
South Africa, Cambridge, C.U.P., 1949, p. 659.
18.Qnint.in Whyte Papers AD 1502 Bb 2.67 "Notes on Potential Article"
September 1963.
19.Quintin Whyte, "The Relevance of Transkeian Development To Race
Relations In South Africa", Johannesburg, S.A.I.R.R., RR 94/63,
1903. See also "Social and Political Aspects of Separate
Development in the Homelands Examined", unptib. mimeo, RR 6/66,
Johannesburg, S.A.I.R.R., 12 January 1966.
20.Quintin Whyte Papers. AD15O2 Ba5 Quintin Whyte memo dated 5
November encl in Q. Whyte to H.E. Oppenheimer 5 November 1963
(marked "By Hand and Confidential").
21. Study Commission on US Policy Toward Southern Africa, South
Africa: Time Running Out, Berkeley, University of California
Press, 1981.
22. C.W. de Kiewiet, "Loneliness in the Beloved Country", Foreign
Affairs, 42, 3 (April 1964), p. 421.
23. Quint in Whvte Papers, Ba 8, Quintin Whyte, "Some Notes on Trip to
the United Kingdom and the United States of America", 1966, p. fi.
Other liberals, though, took a different view and Leo Marquard had
earlier found himself "moving towards a belief that what is called
"pressure" from overseas may be a vital element in our situation",
Leo Marquard Papers, BC587 El.155 L. Marquard to Q. Whyte 20 May
24. Din Vaderlancl6.7 and 8 May 1965.
25. S.A.B.C. - Current Affairs, broadcast entitled "Realities Ignored"
24 February 1967.
26.Qnintin Whyte Papers. Ba 1(5), Q. Whyte to C.W. He Kiewiet 16 June
19(10.
27. Heribert Adam. The Rise of Black Consciousness in South Africa",
Race, XV, 2 (October 1973), pp. 149-65; Robert Fatton Jr, B3ack
Consciousness in South Africa, New York, State University of New
York Press, 1986.
28.Gail Gerhart notes that though Black Consciousness was riot a
completely "imported" ideology "never had such a deliberate and
thorough going effort been made to borrow and selectively adapt
foreign ideas in order to influence mass thinking", GailM.
Gerhart, Black Power in South Africa, Berkeley, University of
California Press, 1978, p. 273. For a more critical view see
Baruch Hirson, Year of Fire. Year of Ash. London, Zed Books, 1979,
pp. 2R2-329.
29. John W. De Gruchy, "A Short History of the Christian Institute" in
Charles Villa-Vicencio and John W. De Gruchy (eds), Resistance and
Hope: South African Essays in Honour of Beyers Naude. Cape Town
and Johannesburg, David Philip, 1985, p. 17. See also Peter
Walshe, "Church Versus State in South Africa: The Christian
Institute and the Resurgence of African Nationalism1', Journal of
Church and State. 19, 3 (1977), pp. 457-79; Church Versus State in
South Africa: The Case of the Christian Institute, London, C.
Hurst and Co., 1983.
30.Van Wyk Papers. Church of the Province Archives, University of the
Witwatersrand, AD1752 4Fb4 Interdenominational African Ministers
Association of Southern Africa, Annual Report, 1963-1964.
31. Van Wyk Papers. 4Da3 memo "Evaluation of the Christian Institute
of Southern Africa" (marked "confidential"), Johannesburg, August
1970.
32. Van Wyk Papers. 4Cbl George J.H. Magqwashe to The Director, C.I.
~2fi June 1966.
33."Evaluation of the Christian Institute", p. 7.
3-1. Van Wyk Papers, 4Fa (7) Beyers Naude "Memorandum on the
Relationship Between AICA and the Christian Institute", (marked
"confidential"), 1972. For details of the splits within AICA see
Black RRview 1972, Durban, Black Community Programmes, 1973, pp.
33-36.
35. Van Wyk Papers, 4Cc3 P. Randall to R.L. Barry 28 August 1968.
36. Van Wyk Papers, 4Dc3 (h) Calvin Cook, "The Statement of the
W.C.C. consultation on racism. By a member of the Executive of the
S.A. Council of Churches", 1 August 1970 (marked "confidential"),
p. 1. For the PCR and its impact on South African churches see
Zolile Mbali, The Churches and Racism: A Black South African
Perspective, London, SCM Press, 1987, pp. 7-62.
37.0uintln Whvte Papers BC627 E7.1.5 Q. Whyte to P. Randall 3
September 1969.
38.SPRO-CAS Papers. Church of the Province Archives, University of
the Witwatersrand, A835 lAd(v) G. Buthelezi to P. Randall 6 August
1970.
39.SPRO-CAS Papers, Background Paper Gen 19, "Black Souls; in White
Skins?" 11 September 1970 repr. from SASO, August 1970.
40. It was also felt by some of those involved such as A.S. Mathews
that the Spro-Cas project "should not in my view invite African
representation just for the sake of having them", SPRO-CAS Papers,
835/Ad6v A.S. Mathews to P. Randall 10 August 1970.
41.SPRO-CAS Papers. 835/Ad6v A. Du Toit to P. Randall 13 July 1970.
42. Ibid., A. Paton to P. Randall February 3 1970.
43.Richard Turner, "Black Consciousness and White Liberals".Reality,
4, 3 (July 1972), pp. 20-22.
44+., SPRO-CAS Papers, 835/Ad6v R. Turner unpub. ms enlc. in P.
Randall to D. Welsh September 5 1972. For John Rex's ideas see
John Rex, "ThePlural Society: The South African Case".Race. 12, 4
(1971), repr. in John Rex, Race. Colonialism and The City, London
and Boston, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973, pp. 269-83.
45. Ibid., R. Turner unpub handwritten memo n.d.
46.See the important essay by David Yudelman, "State and Capital in
South Africa" in Butler, Elphick and Welsh op. cit.. pp. 250-70.
M . Edgar Brookes, "Minority Report", South Africa's Political
Alternatives. Johannesburg, SPRO-CAS, 1973, pp. 243-44. For
Brookes's political shift away from segregationism towards a more
integrationist liberalism see Edgar Brookes, A South African
Pilgrimage, Johannesburg, Ravan Press, 1977: Paul B. Rich, "The
City of God and the Crisis of Political Faith: Edgar Brookes and
the 'lie in the soul' of South African segregation" unpublished
seminar paper, University of Cape Town and Rhodes University,
19fl7.
48. Denis Worrall, "Personal Statement", South Africa's Political
AI ternat.i vest pp. 245-48.
49. Ibid.» P- 87-
50.Ibid., p. 102.
51.Ibid., pp. 108-10.
f>2. The Argus 1.8 December 1.973.
53.Quintin Whyte Papers, BCG27 D2.120 C. Eglin to Q. Whyte 16 July
1973.
54. SPRO-CAS Papers A835/Ad6v R. Turner to P. Randall n.d. end notes
on draft report; P. Randall to A.S. Matthews February 28 1973.
55.W.A. de Klerk, "Christian neo marxism?", Pro Veritate. 15
September 1972, p. 12.
50. Stephen R. Clingman, The Novels of Nadine Gordimer: History From
T-!M:_LUSJJ1?.> Johannesburg, Ravan Press, 1986, pp. 90-134; see also
Paul Rich, "Liberal Realism in South African Fiction,1948-66",
English in Africa, 12, 1 (May 1985), pp. 47-81.
57.Richard Turner, The Eve of the Needle: Toward Participatory
Democracy in South Africa, Maryknoll (New York), Orbis Books, 1978
(1 ed. SPRO-CAS, Johannesburg, 1972), p. 94. There has been no
general assessment of Rick Turner's thought for SouthAfrican
politics, but see M.A. Nupen, "Philosophy and theCrisis in South
Africa", Transformation, 7 (1988), pp. 37-46.
iil. * PP. 96, 138.
59. J_bid., pp. 122-23, 153.
60. Ibid., p. i i.
61. SPRO-CAS Papers. A835/B10.11 P. Randall to The Editor, The Cape
Times June 21 1972.
62.SPRO-CAS Papers, A835/B11.iii, Report on a seminar on strategies
for change held at the Ecumenical Centre, Stellenbosch, over the
weekend 29th September to 1st October 1973. The convenor was
Nevilie Curtis, p. 7.
G3.ihi(J., p. 11.
64.Ibid.. p. 18. Black Revolution was generally seen in the seminar
as "non viable change", p. 19.
65.Rlack Community Programmes, Year Report. 1972.
fifi. SPRO-CAS Papers. A835/B4 Minutes of Spro-Cas Staff Discussions,
27-28 January 1972.
07. SPRO-CAS Papers A835/B10iii B. Khoapa, "Memo from Mr Khoapa on
Sponsorship of SPRO-CAS, n.d.; A835/133 P. Randall to B. Naude De
cember 18 1972. Khoapa saw SPRO-CAS's role as "co-ordimating
current change rather than initiating new programmes - this iscon
sistent with the broad view of SPRO-CAS as an enabling body",
ihid., Report of the First Meeting of the Joint Liaison Committee
of SPRO-CAS Sponsors, 13 March 1972, p. 3.
f>8. SPRO-CAS Papers, A835/B10iii Minutes of Joint Meeting of Black
Panels held in Johannesburg 27 July 1972.
69. Black Review 1972, Durban, B.C.P., 1973, p. 48.
70.lleribert Adam, "The Rise of Black Consciousness in South Africa",
p. 158.
71. See for example the Presidential Address by I.D. MacCrone, The
Price of Apartheid. Johannesburg, SAIRR, 1970, for a restatement
of this view.
72.Leo Maronard Papers. BC587 El.288 L. Marquard to F. Van Wyk 27
November 1972.
73.Leo Marnnard Papers. BC587 El.242 Q. Whyte to L. Marquard 3
January ]9fi9.
7'1.Qnintin Whyte Papers, BC627 E2.112 F. Van Wyk to Q. Whyte 4 June
1970.
75. "The Nature and Aims of the S.A. Institute of Race Relations",
Survey of Race Relations. 1.972.
76.F.J. Van Wyk, "Black Consciousness: The Institute's Position As I
See It", Johannesburg, SAIRR, Memo RR 120/72, January 1973.
77.Jaap Boekooi, "The Man in the Race Relations Mot Seat", The Star.
6 May 1972.
7ft. Ellen Hellman, Culture Contacts and Social Change", Race Relations
Journal. XV, 1-2 (1948), p. 35. For the intellectual context in
which this conservative anthropology emerged in South Africa in
the lnt.e 1930s and 1940s see Hugh Macmillan, "Paralysed
conservatives: W.M. Macmillan, the social scientists and the"commo*
society", 1923-48", paper presented to the conference to mark
the centenary of the birth of W.M. Macmillan, London, Institute
of Commonwealth Studies, 4-5 October 1985.
79. See for example Ellen Hellman, Racial Laws Versus Economic and
Social, forces. Johannesburg, SAIRR, 1955.
80. Ellen Hellman Papers. Church of the Province Archives, University
of the Witwatersrand, A1418/14 D. Grice to P. Van Wyk 16 April
1973.
81. Quj_ptin Whyte Papers. AD1502 Bal(6) E. Hellman to Q. Whyte 19
March 1073.
B2.Quintin Whyte Papers. ADI502 Bal (6) E. Hellman to Q. Whyte 12
April 1973. Alan Paton also opposed the Institute's decision,
The Star May 11 1973.
83. The Sunday Times (Johannesburg) 18 March 1973.
84.The Star May 11 1973.
85.The Star April 2 1973; A. Holiday "The Sedate Liberals Show Their
Teeth", Rand Daily Mail, May 22 1973.
85. Van Wyk Papers, RC587 El.311 Clive Nettleton, memo "The Young
Person's Guide To The Road Ahead", May 1973,p.2. Nettleton also
suggested "action research in which we may try to involve
communities in research on problems affecting them", C. Nettleton
to F. Van Wyk, Johannesburg, SAIRR, memo dated 5 June 1973, p. 2.
07. White Power and the Liberal Conscience, pp. 73-76.
88.Ellen Hellman Papers. AD1279/M2.1 E. Hellman to A.S. Mathews 31
October 1973. See also Ellen Hellman, The South African Institute
of Race Relations. 1929-1979: A Short History. Johannesburg,
SAIRR, 1979, p. 20.
fl9..VHjL_Wyj£_2i!ners HC587 El.311 II. Van Der Merwe to F. Van Wyk May28
1973 urging that the Institute's research committee"concentrate
on research that will produce material relevant to the development
of Black Consciousness, workers organisations and the development
of responsible black leadership"; Ellen Hellman Papers AD1279/M2.2
A.S. Mathews, "The South African Institute of Race Relations -
Future Policy", Johannesburg, SAIRR Memo RR136/73 pointing out
that "Both the activist and the non activist may wish to encourage
the same response; but the activist's words are meant to be a
trigger to action whereas those of the non activist are
essentially a trigger to thought and reflection prior to action";
L. Schlemmer to the Director, SAIRR, 8 November 1973; A.S. Mathews
to E. Hellman 7 November 1973.
9O.K13.en lie 11 man Papers. AD1279/M.2.2 F.O. Joseph, memo "The Future
Role of the Institute", 25 July 1973.
91 . Ellen Hell man Papers, AD1279/M2.2 E. Hellman to F. Van Wyk 17
November 1973.
92.The South African Institute of Race Relations, 45th Annual Report
1973-1974, p. 1
93.South African Institute of Race Relations, 46th Annual Report
1974-1975, p. 1.
94.Colin Legum. Southern Africa: The Diplomacy of Detente, London,
Rex Collins, 1975, p. 16.
95.Andre Du Toit, "Anomalies in Our Political Structure", Race
Relations News. 37 3 (March 1975), pp. 4-6.
96. Sam C. Nolutshnngu, Changing South Africa. Manchester, Manchester
University Press, 1982, p. 175.
97.11irson op. cit. . p. 295.
Qfl.Njabulo NdebeJe, "Black Development1* in Njabulo Ndebele (ed),
HI^O-L^yi'Qiill:» Durban, SPRO-CAS Black Community Programme,
1072, p. 15.
9-»- J.L'J.d- , P. 2 0 .
100.N i gel Gibson, "Black Consciousness, 1976-87: The Dialectics of
Liberation in South Africa", Africa Today, 1st Qtr. 1988,
pp. 5-20.
1.01. For nn account of the Black Consciousness trial see The Testimony
of Steve Biko. London, Panther Books, 1979.
102.White Power and the Liberal Conscience, pp. 47-49; "Bernard lluss,
Mariannhill and African Cooperatives".
1G3.Gerhart on. cit.
1O4.C.M.C.N<iamse, "The New Day" in Ndebele on. cit,. p. 37.
105..lames II. Cone, "Black Consciousness and the Black Church" in
Thoahlane Thoahlane (ed)» Black Renaissance: Papers From The
Black Renaissance Convention. Johannesburg, Ravan Press, 1975,
p. 69. See also Fatton on* cit.. pp. 107-119; David Bosch,
"Currents and Crosscurrents in South African Black Theology",
Journal of Religion in Africa. 11, 1 (1974), pp. 1-22.
10G. Mnfika Pascal Gwala, "Towards The Practical Manifestationof
Black Consciousness" in ibid p. 25.
1G7.A1M.II Brooks and Jeremy Brickhill, Whirlwind Before t he Storm.
London, International Defence and Aid, 1980, pp. 85-99; Hirson,
on. cit, pp. 102-105.
